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philosopher  Arthur  Schopenhauer  referred to that f&ous  conundrum  as the  Wdtknoten, the 
“Workl Knot.” Economic  history  is more prosaic.  Yet the economic  experience  of the United 
States between  World War I and the end of World War II did generate  one problem with nearly 
so sweeping repercussions  in its field: the behavior  of wages. 
This period  spans the slump following  World War I, the Roaring  Twenties,  the Great 
lbnrmzainn  the  New  lbal  rrtd  WnrlA  War  Tl  timpe  nf  tal  -a  Pmn-PIE;n”  PXICIII,  fnrm  nf  L-ryrrbwrvu)  LUI a .w..  YIIU  -  . . VllY  I.  Ly Aa==  L-Y  “I  C_IIIvY  VAA”“~~  vrvr,  l”l_  “I 
economic,  technological,  political  and social change.  Studies of wage determination  during this 
time can therefore  illuminate many competing  hypotheses,  perhaps more effectively than studies 
of the more-tranquil  postwar  period.’  Such inquiries also have intriguing  implications  for other 
fields, including history,  political  science, and even international  relations. 
Yet systematic assessments of the relevant  empirical evidence are rare; previous  studies 
knd  tn  k  mnnnmnhic  ’  The  eswliest  mn  he  tmr.pA  hmk  tn  the  thirtiw  when  rlnta  rnllprtec?  hv  ___-  __  --  ---w-r--*  -ai  R--Y-  _-  .T_ .a-_..  -a.  ..a .&A”  ..M.UVY,  .1-u  -  -v--“~“y  “J 
the Federal government  (and studies by Paul Douglas)  became widely available. This wave crested 
between the end of World War II and the late fiflies. A second and very recent wave followed  the 
decay of the original postwar  Anxrican  wage system.  In line with the focus of much recent 
research  on inequality,  it emphasizes work-force  characteristics,  technological  change, and the 
acquisition  of skills3 
The major studies of the Crst wave agreed that inter-industry  wage dif&zrentials  narrowed 
substantially  during World War II, as did skill diffixentials.  But these studies differed sharply in 
other respects, particularly  in their assessments of the stability of wage structures  in both the long 
2 and short run  These early studies were marked,  also, by inconsistent  conchrsiins  about the 
pattern  of relative  wage changes at important junctures,  such as in parts of the Depression  and the 
1920-21 downturn4  Differences  of measurement  and method  accounted  in part for these 
inconsistencies5 
The early studies also made little effort to investigate  whether political  events  such as the 
New Deal or such economic  developments  as changes in international  trade or the devaluation  of 
the dollar in 1933 afhxted  the evohrtion  of the wage structure;  unionization  is the only politico- 
economic  event to receive extensive discussion.  And most investigators  in this early Keynesian  era 
appeared  to share a conviction  that changes  in the inter-industry  wage structure  over several 
decades occurred  in a  neoclas&al  long run, and were not consequences  of wage policy,  market 
power,  or changes  in aggregate  demand.6 
The newest wave of studies &ink@ avows that the “Great Compression”  of the  1940s in 
. 
Amerxan  wages was strongly  rooted  in the Ml  employment  policies of  World War II. Progress, 
to be sure, has been made.’  Still, many threads  from the wage-historical  World Knot continue  to 
dangle. What were the roles of politics, trade,  technology,  unions and the year-to-year 
fluctuations  of the business cycle?  How much can be attributed  to the rising educational  levels of 
the workforce?  What happened  to inequality  in this period,  and why? Wii  these questions  in 
mind,  a fresh look  at wage behavior  between  1920 and 1947 should be rewarding,  particularly  if 
it draws on data that other  studies have not fully exploited  and on techniques  that i&u&ate  this 
data in fresh and interesting  ways. The Present  Study 
This paper uses industrial wage data and a systematic  ifunconventional  selection  of 
methods  to examine changes in the inter-industry  stru&ure of wages between  1920 and  1947. 
Our data come from published sources and most of them have been used in earlier papers, 
though  we believe we are first to use all of them in a single analysis. Many previous  studies rely 
on detailed data from either the Census Bureau or the Bureau of  Labor  Statistics.  Unfortunately, 
before the mid thirties these sources reported  data for many industries only at fairly long intervals, 
sometimes only once or twice a decade.  Our approach  requires regular and complete  time series, 
and for this paper we have brought  together  annual data from a variety of sources on (nominal) 
average hourly earnings for workers  in 83 difI&ent industries or industry branches,  including two 
cases broken  down by region,  t?om 1920 to  1947. We reach beyond man&ctming,  where most 
of our data come &om surveys conducted  by the National  Industrial  Con&rence  Board,  an 
important  source for that time. Eventually  we succeeded in l~ting  data for railroads,  electric 
utilities, coal mining, gas utilities, construction  (where we have separate series for skilled and 
unskilled labor), public roads disaggregated  by region,  and agriculture  (also broken  down by 
region); these are described in detail in Appendix 2. The series for railroads  are divided into 3 1 
occupational  subcategories;  these are described further in Appendix 3. 
This data set provides  a solid base for testing important  hypotheses  about the labor market 
in this period.  But one also has to acknowledge  its limitations.  First, some parts of the economy, 
notably the retail trades,  are still shortchanged.  Second, these data are aggregated;  all the series 
that cover the period as a whole refer to all workers  within each industry. Inevitably,  therefore, 
4 one runs risks of slighting important  differences within industries,  between  flrmq  among regions, 
across cities, within companies,  and between  skilled and unskilled labor.  Given that most workers 
inmost  ofthese  industries were -males  and predominantly  white,  it is also d.if%cult  to 
unravel i&uences  of  race or gender.  But thanks to the diligence of the Conference  Board  in 
those  years,  a subset for B  covering  the period  192 l-37  reports  wages separately  in 
each Mustry  by gender and skill levels; data for skill levels are also available for a few other 
sectors.  By combining these bits of  information,  we are able to hazard some generalizations  about 
how the New Deal and rising demand for labor during World War II may have altered the ways 
gender and skill figured in labor markets.* 
We analyze our data in several stages. Inspired by Dunlop’s classic discussion  of wage 
contours,  recent work in business history,  and Katz and Summers’ work on industry-specific  labor 
rents, we first attempt  to sort among the 83 “industries”  for blocs that appear to exhibit common 
patterns  of wage changes9  The appropriate  technique  for this is cluster analysis; the technical 
details, which follow earlier papers by GalbAth  and Calmon (1994,1996,  see also Galbmith 
1998), appear in Appendix  1. The cardinal point  is that annual rates of wage change are the 
criterion  variable and industries are sorted according  to the similar@ of their paths of wage 
change through  time.  The actual clustering  procedure  is Wards  minimum-variance  method,  using 
Euclidean  distances in a phase hyperplane  whose dimensional@  equals the number of years under 
observation. 
The basic idea of industry-specific  labor rents is that under some conditions  employees, 
rather than owners,  can succeed in capturing  part of the gains from an imperfectly  competitive market  structure  (Katz and Summers  1989). It is a simple step forward to argue that differences  iu 
patterns  of wage change  across industries through  time reflect differences  in the economic 
performance  (and therefore  of gross rents) of the industries themselves.  It follows that iftwo 
industrial  subgroups have similar patterns  of wage change through  a sufliciently  extended  history, 
marching up in some years and down in others  but always substantially  in step, then it is likely that 
they are being influenced by the whole range of external forces in similar ways.  We may then 
infer that they are, in some economically  w  sense, closely related to each other. 
Precisely how many groups one distinguishes  depends iu the end on one’s ser.Gtivity to 
small diEem  in performance.  As we wiIl see momentarily,  our analysis yields a set of tables 
andasuiking  treediagramindicatingthatthe83industriesandbranchescanbedividedquite 
cleanly  into eight distinct groups.  This indicates that there are eight usefully distinct patterns  of 
wage chauge in the data; lesser variations  may be treated  as occurring  within groups. 
We then investigate  how these variations  might be a&cted  by differences  of skill and 
gender within the workforce.  Our analysis, which is based on the smaller sample of industries and 
shorter time time period  for which relevant  data are available, leads to a surprising conclusion. 
Differences  in the rates of wage change between  skilled or semi-skilled and unskilled workers 
mattered  little; such dif%rences within industries were almost always smaller than dif%rences in 
wage change between  industries. On the other hand, our evidence about gender suggests that in 
this period women’s work constituted  something  of an “industry”  in its own right.  Since it was, in 
effect, a special firm  of common  labor practiced  across conventional  industry lines, it was 
affected dramatically  by improvements  in the position  of the lowest paid workers  during the New Deal and World War II. 
The next stage is an exploratory  data analysis. By plotting  the average  annual rates of 
wage change of the various industries and industry segments iu our clusters, we can illustrate  how 
each group reacted  to landmark events.  We also compare how wages iu each group performed 
through  time with respect to the others.  This stage, though  necessarily  info@  provides  a ‘Yeel’ 
for the data which will prove useful in interpreting  the more formal analaysis to follow. 
Following  this, we present a systematic  decomposition  of the sources of wage variation 
across groups  aud through  time. We compute  the canonical  roots  of a d&rSuant  fbmtion, 
designed so as best to separate the wage change pe&rmance  of each group of industries over the 
period.  This yiekis a set of eigenvectors,  consisting  of  weights or impulses, each of which is a 
representation  of a kneally independent  force acting on the wage structure.  Thefactthatour 
cluster analysis relies on wage-change  observations  in percentage  form produces  eigenvectors  in 
time-series  fbrmat; thus each eigenvector  is itselfan  artificially constructed  economic  time series. 
We identify four such forces that together  explain 97% of the variance  in wage change across 
groups.  Of these, the first two account  for 75% of all cross-cluster  variations  and the first one 
alone accounts  for over half 
To mmmarbe,  by this point  we will have established:  first, that a very high proportion  of 
total  wage variation  in this period  was inter-industriak  second, that inter-industrial  variations  were 
dominated  by the relative movements  of eight large clusters; and third, that most cross-cluster 
variations  can be reduced to just two canonical time-series,  with four accounting  for Mually  all 
of them. This raises a beguiling possibii.  It may be that  simple explanations  account  for most of 
the relative-wage  changes during the tumultuous  twenty-seven  years under study. In a reversal of 
the usual notions  of micro-to-macro  causality,  it may be that a small number of macroeconomic 
variates account  for a large proportion  of distributional  changes. The fact that  our  eigenvectors 
have a time-series  representation  suggests that they may also have an historical  interpretation,  a 
meaning. Can these forces be identified as substantially  similar to, as in effect reflections  ofl 
known  and perhaps even fkmilkr  events? 
The traditional  method  of assign@meaningtoaweightingfbnctionindiscrimkntor 
f&or  analysis involves computing  a ‘Canonical score” (or factor  score) fbr each object,  and 
inferring meaning from the distribution  of scores across objects.  This is a purely post hoc 
procedure,  and absent some form of hypothesis  test the resulting  inkence  cannot  be regarded  as 
CnaL Our procedure  permits a crude test, for the fact that our eigenvectors  are time series allows 
us to compare the root  directly to the time path of those historical  economic  time series one 
conjectures  may be closely associated  with it. We find the visual evidence in several cases 
compelling,  and on occasion  simple correlation  or bivariate regression  coefficients  are, in fact, 
sign&ant.  On the other hand,  the fkct that we are often dealing with multiple, closely collinear 
explanandk  for our exphnandum  -- for instance, exchange rate ratios for several difkent 
countries  for a root  apparently  associated  with the terms of trade -- means that multi-variate 
regression  coefficients  are typically unstable.  As with all historical  research,  the possibility  of 
course also exists that the comparisions  may be improved by the discovery  of more appropriate 
historical  series. 
8 In a linal section,  we return to the underlying  data  The group-wise  decomposability  of 
Theil’s T measure of inequality  (see Appendix  1, section 4) permits us to compute  an estimate  of 
the evolution  of inequality in the wage structure  over time.  This estimate  is independent  of our 
clustering  procedures  and of our dis&mbnt  analysis, and unlike those procedures  it produces  a 
measure of changing relative wage dispersion that is weighted  by the relative  size of the 
underlying  classes of economic  activity  -- in particular,  it gives the heavy weight to agriculture 
that the large size of the f&n  population  in those days demanded.  This measure is well-suited  to 
regression  analy&.  Using it, we test a simple macroeconomic  explanation  of inequality  in the 
wage structure.  The results are spectacular.  We think they carry implications  for several major 
questions  of  theory  and policy. 
Stage I: Cluster Am@&3 
Figure I presents the cluster analysis. The figure should be read as though  it depicted  the 
American economy  as a sort of multidivisional  corporation  a  la Chandler (1962). By beginning 
at the top, and tracing  downward  through  each major fork in the chart, increasingly  detailed 
groupings  of industries become visible. 
How much clustering  one wants to work with finally depends on the researcher.  Few 
interesting  questions  in economic  history  are likely to be answered by reference to the two giant 
clusters revealed  in the upper parts of the figure -  essentially railroads,  coal, and utilities on one 
side,  and everything  else on the other. Nor would it make sense to keep clustering  until the 
differences between industries became so fine that one reached a Euclidean  distance of 0 at the 
9 bottom  of the graph, when one would be back to 83 diBerent subgroups  including some thirty-one 
occupational  subdivisions of the railroads.1o In this paper we work with the eight rather  large 
clusters identified in stylized form by the names in smaller print on the figure (‘Farms,”  ‘Textiles,” 
etc.).  For some purposes,  we condense  the two railroad  clusters into one. 
These clusters appear sensible on both casual and close examination.  Virtual& the entire 
large cluster indicated by the top left fork in Figure I  refers to the railroad  industry.  Two of the 
bii  lower level clusters nested within the broader  railroad  grouping  represent  branches of that 
industry exclusively.  They separate,  broadly,  the through&eight  and passenger  workers  from the 
local line and office workers  of this by-then heavily regulated  industry.  The third branch 
(denominated  “Utilities”)  includes the coal industry, the gas and electric utilities, and two 
industries with exceptionally  strong unions,  books and newspapers.  This last branch also includes 
one entity from the railroad  group,  “Yard Firemen and Helpers,” that seems anomalous  but 
probably  isn’t.  Firemen and their helpers handled fuels -- in this period,  mostly coal” 
The right-hand  prong of the great top fbrk breaks down into two large clusters.  The f&t, 
flaring to the left, consists entirely of one sector broken  down by region:  agriculture.  The second, 
leading down to the right, divides into several nested subclusters.  Off by itselfon  the left is a 
cluster contain&  all the regional  branches of  public road building, with a single instructive 
exception.  On the right, we find all the rest of manuf&tu&g  industry. 
This &al  right fork contains  three subclusters,  stylized in Figure I as “Capital Goods,” 
“Textiles,”  and “Mass Production.”  This part of Figure I, with its restricted  range of variation,  is 
essentially what papers that analyze data only for  manufacturing  have examined. Within these 
10 subclusters, there are well-defined  patterns.  The left most subcluster  -  our “capital  goods”  -- 
roughly  de&s  what in the USSR at that time was symbolized by the name %takhanov”:  toilers 
in foundries,  heavy equipment,  machines and machine tools,  hardware  and small parts, paper 
products,  and both skilled and un&lled  constructiot~‘* 
The remaining two subclusters contain  the rest of American manufacturing  for which we 
have data. The first  -  “Textiles” -  consists of several sub-subchrsters with readily intelligible 
internal linkages:  cotton  and wool,  linked to another  subeluster of silk and rayon and hosiery 
knit&g,  plus hnnber,  and boots  and shoes. All were labor-intensive  but essentially  non-mass 
production  industries that were sensitive not only to labor costs but also to the price of 
commodities  and raw materials. 
Two industries that also processed  commodities  but were celebrated  examples of mass 
production  -- rubber and meat packing  -  cluster with a bloc of other  industries:  paint, chemicals, 
leather, f&iture,  and iron and steel,  Like the sectors in “Textiles” and most of the industries  in 
our “Capital Goods”  group, these industries were recutrently  tempted  by economic  nationalism  in 
the inter-war  period,  either because they faced strong  international  competition  in export  markets 
or depended  directly on tarEprotection  in the home market.  In our cluster analysis, however, 
they link up with another  subchtster of mass production  industries:  autos,  foundry machinery, 
agricultural  implements, electrical  machinery,  and paper and pulp. This latter group includes some 
of the most intemationally  successful of all American fitms in this period  The lesson we draw 
from the proximity of the nationalistic  sectors to the international  success stories is one that 
contemporaries  also drew: a dominant  effect of protectionism  is to protect.13 
11 By the end of our period,  it is well known that wage settlements  in steel, autos,  and a 
handful of other  large unionized  industries were setting the pattern  fbr many other  industries.  But 
how and when did this system get underway?  Some authorities  trace its beginnings to the years 
just prior to World War II, partly because heavy unionization  in autos,  rubber and steel came only 
in the late 1930s. But this is not the only possiiility.  Since the underlying technologies,  market 
structures  and demand relationships  long antedated  the Congress of Industrial  Organizations 
(CIO), it could also have been that the post-war  wage system actually evolved  from pm-union 
patterns,  and merely represented  a more formal version of something that was already evolving  in 
the years afler World War I.” 
Here, our results tend to support the nG&ream  view. Consider how steel, rubber, and 
autos  fare in our classification..  By comparison  with the gulfthat  divides these industries  from the 
rest of the economy,  the distance  separating them from each other does not amount to much.  So 
while linkages between these three pattern-setters  run back into the  1920s;  linkages from them to 
the rest of the economy  evidently do not.  While the post-war  system of national  patterns  assuredly 
emerged out of processes  and events that we discuss in this paper, it represented  genuine 
development,  not simply an extrapolation  of previously-existing  trendsI 
A tighter  if less momentous  set of linkages emerges in the relationship  of wages in  public 
road construction  to those  in agriculture.  During the inter-war period,  analysts and advocates  for 
the rural poor  complained  repeatedly  that rural elites were manipulating  wage levels on public 
relief projects  to assure a suitably compliant,  truly low-wage  work force for the farms. 
Subsequent  work by economic  historians  suggests that, at least in the South, those complaints 
12 were justi&d.16  Our clustering,  too,  suggests that through  the twenties,  wage changes on public 
road projects  did in fact closely resemble those in agriculture.  In the thirties,  however,  wages in 
road buikhng -- a quintessential  New Deal activity  -  moved toward  the mant&ctur&  pattern 
and away from that in agriculture.  As a consequence,  in a cluster analysis for the entire period 
wage patterns  in public roads resemble  a half-way house between the two worlds of agriculture 
and industrial production. 
The one outlier  among the regional  subsectors  fbr public roads is the Pacific region.  This 
shows up in an entirely difherent (right hand) prong of the fork, where most of American 
manufacturing  industry can be found. At tlrst glance this separation  of roads in the far Northwest 
from agriculture  and the rest of  public roads appears anomalous.  But with a closer look the 
puzzle disappears;  the Pacific region public roads wages did closely track wages not in farming -- 
but in the locally dominant  lumber industry.  This exception  thus conforms  nicely to a larger rule. 
The clusters portrayed  in Figure I reflect patterns  of wage variation  across the workforce 
as a whole. But one natmahy  asks how the results would appear ifone  examined the fate of 
particular  social and demographic  groups,  such as women workers,  skilled workers,  or individual 
ethnic and racial groups.  Would our focus on inter-industrial  variation  still appear justified, or 
would some other  classification  principle come instead to predominate? 
We  have been unable to find data that  allow us to compare  how racial groups  fared within 
the industries in our data set. But we do have data on the annual average hourly earnings of  male 
skilled  and unskilled workers  between  1921 and  1937 in the man&cturing  industries as well as 
in printing and news; these data come from Conference  Board  surveys that requested  each 
13 establishment  to distinguish  between purely unskilled workers  and all others.  Similar data also 
exist for skilled aud unskilled construction  workers,  under the safe assumption  that women 
workers  in that  sector were few.  Obviously,  a classification  that lumps semi-skilled with highly- 
skilledworkersisnotideal,butoverawideraageof~~~thisdistinction,ifitisimportant, 
might be expected to show up in di&rent  patterns  for industries requiring  large proportions  of 
highly skilled craft workers  as against those  where the “skilled” group was dominated  by 
semiskilledtactoryhatlds. 
Figure II shows the result: the skilled and unskilled portions  within each industrial 
category  vktuahy  all appear &se  together.  In most cases, they are side-by-side.”  This is a 
simple showing of an important  i%ct.  In the period we are concerned  with, changes between 
industries were -  ahnost  always -  more important  in explaiuing patterns  of  wage change than 
was the evolution  of the skill&tmkilM  differential  within industries. Further  discussion follows, 
but the basic result (illustmted  in Figure XVIII)  is that once inter-industrial  variations  are 
controlled  fbr, variations  of the the skill di.@erential  are minor, with exceptions  mainly in printing 
and coustruction  which may indeed reflect a high proportion  of craft workers  in those  trades. 
For the same time span, data are also available for annual average hourly earnings of 
wages of men and women in our  man-  iudustries.18 As Figure III indicates,  gender is a 
difErent  story.  Sex proves to be a more important  marker of iutra-industry  wage change than 
skill.  On the right hand side of the figure (which, again, refers exclusively to manufacturing 
industries between  1921 and 1937) we find groups of iudustries in which wages of males tracked 
each other closely -- autos, foundries  and machinery,  or chemicals. On the left are several clusters 
14 in which industry played the dominant  role in determining  wage changes for both genders -- 
printing  is a representative  case. In the center-right,  are those  industries whose f&e  workers 
had closely co-moving  wages. 
In interpreting  these clusters, it is useful to note that the proportion  of women working  in 
different  industries varied hugely.  In hosiery  and knitting,  fbr instance,  women comprised  a large 
percentage  of the workforce.  Other industries,  such as t&mdries, employed  very few.  And in 
many industries,  such as automobiles,  the work done by women difhxed  markedly  l?om that 
performed  by males, and so one is in effect looking  at a within-industry  occupational  classification 
into which female workers  were steer~~I.*~ 
Looking  at the evidence for individual industries, we notice  that many show a reduction  in 
the “‘gender gap” -- the ratio of ratio  of women’s to men’s average hourly earnings -- in the early 
New Deal years. We will have more to say about this process  later, when we consider  how 
various New Deal policies,  including unionization,  minimum wages and dollar devaluation, 
a&&xl  industries in which women worked  in large numbers. For now, our conclusion  is simply 
that the low pay ratios are evidence that women’s work in this period was essentially a special 
form of common  labor. Precisely because of this,  women workers  benefitted  disproportionately 
tirn  the developments  which improved the relative position  of the lowest paid workers  during 
the New Deal and World War II. 
Stage II -- Exploratory  Data Analysis 
Figures IV, V, VI, and VII explore  some of our findings. They are in effect a graphical 
15 commentary  on the debates mentioned  earlier over how wages changed within and between 
industries. 
Figure IV begins by separately plotting  wage change in each of our major clusters over 
time, save that the two railroad  groups have been consolidated.  Figure V displays rates of wage 
change for a number of individual industries extensively  discussed in the literature,  but here 
consolidated  within the seven large groups.  We present them as concrete  examples of the more 
generalpatterns. 
For example, Figure V shows a dramatic collapse of construction  wages in the severe 
downturnof1920-21.1talsotestifiestoanothersharplhllinthewagesofbothskilledand 
common construction  workers  between  1930 and 1932, which bottomed  out only as wages in 
other  sectors, which had Mien less, were also turning up afler passage of the Davis-Bacon  Act 
defendingthepre~wageinconstructionin1931.TheriseinfarmwagesintheSecond 
World War jumps  off the page and will play an important  role in our story later on,  So does the 
sharp run up in coal-miners  wages in 1934. 
The most suggestive tit  recorded  by Figures IV and V together  concerns  the relative  rise 
of wages in textiles and related industries at the outset  of the New Deal  (Figure IV’s “Textiles” 
refers to the whole cluster as earlier defined, Figure V plots the cotton  industry separately.)  Along 
with the coal miners,  unions in these industries  are widely credited  with kicking  off the historic 
wave of strikes and union-recognition  struggles that began shortly after the passage of the 
National  Recovery  Act in 1933. The textile and coal unions also spearheaded  the campaign that 
led to the lhmous split within the ranks of the A.F.L. and the formation  of the C.I.0.20 
16 What explains the sudden upsurge of mihtancy within this sector,  which had never before 
and never would again witness such shiking  success in raising its wages relative to pay in other 
industries? 
What may possibly explain it, we think,  is something that  Labor  historians  have neglected: 
the di&rential  efkcts  of dollar devaluation  and the Roosevelt  admh&mtion’s  decision to go off 
the gold standard  as it inaugurated  the National  Recovery  Admit&ration.  Textiles and garments 
were at that time pressed vigorously  by foreign competitors.  Not only had the British recently 
floated the pound and erected the Ottawa  System (creating problems  for many Amerkan 
manufacturers)  but in addition  textiles,  garments and their supplier industries  (notably  rayon) 
faced a special challenge:  low cost competition  from the Orient, particularly  Japan (see e.g., 
Wright,  1995). Along with the demand stimulus arising from the New Deal’s  relief activities  (at 
that time very limited) and its equally slow-moving  efforts to unfreeze fkozen banking assetq 
dollar devaluation  suddenly created  demand and thus the possibility  of profits.  This was 
something  to fight over in an industry that had stagnated  since the end of the First World War?l 
The early success of the textile unions in capturing  some of those  gains, in turn, helped 
fuel the broader  drives for unionization.  First, although  one usually associates  textiles with cities 
and coal mining with the countryside,  in parts of the Northeast  and the South these two industries 
importantly  overlapped.  In many instances, the textile industry appears to have drawn much of its 
workforce  from wives, children or other extended  family members of miners. The dramatic 
successes of their kin and neighbors  can hardly have dampened  spirits among male miners when 
John L. Lewis famously sounded the trumpet  soon &  the US abandoned  gold and textiles 
17 wages had commenced their dramatic rise. Second, what was sauce for the business goose  could 
also, in the special conditions  of the devaluation(s),  become sauce for the labor gander. By 
recycling  of a portion  of its newly replenished  treasury  into the C.I.O.‘s organizing  efforts, 
organized  labor, too,  showed it appreciated  the logic of the investment  theory  of party 
competitions 
The textile workers  had not, of course,  discovered  a foolproof  way to hold on to the gains 
from devaluation  in the long run  As Figure IV shows, workers  in this group of industries  did not 
do as well, in terms of annual rates of wage improvement,  as those  elsewhere in manufacturing 
through  the middle and late  1930s.  By 1936 -  at which time monetary  stabilization,  represented 
by accords  like the Tripartite  Monetary  Agreement  between the U.S., Britain and France, was 
becoming acutely controversial  (Ferguson,  1995, p. 155) -- wage gains in textiles were falling 
behind most other  industry groups. It nevertheless  appears that the devaluation  of 1933 may have 
played a distinct role in the causal chain leading to the creation  of the CIO, setting up a path- 
dependent  and, perhaps,  spatially conditioned  sequence of events that would have otherwise 
played out di&rently. 
As Figure VI indicates,  in many industries gender gaps improved  (they were not, of 
course,  eliminated)  early in the New Deal  While some of this doubtless  reflects the impact of 
unionization  and minimum wage laws, including those  incorporated  in many National  Recovery 
AdmiGtration  codes, the crucial point  is that taken together  these political  and economic 
developments  actually conferred  relative gains on women workers.  And the rebirth of the 
women’s movement  that marked the years of the High New Deal surely owed at least as much to 
18 this sudden broad empowering  of women workers  as it did to the personal  bfiuence  of well 
known  individual women  such as Eleanor  Roosevelt  or Frances Perkins” 
Because we do not have employment  weights for our individual industries we cannot 
compute  weighted  average wage levels by year for our chrsters. The next best thing is to compute 
the evolution  of the relative  wage structure  from a common base year, and this is possible because 
we know that the within-cluster  departures  f?om a common  growth  rate are small.  Figure VII 
plots relative wage movements,  with  1920 set to  100, for all of the major groups of our cluster 
analysis. This figure thus summa&e s the relative evolution  of the entire American wage structure, 
beginning with the postwar  slump of 1920. 
As the speculative  boom that followed  the  19  18 armistice gave way to the sharp recession 
in 1920, the wage structure  split apart.”  In agricuhure  (and public roads) where wages were 
lowest, wages fizll  the most. In coal and utilities, where wages were among the highest, they fell 
the least. Indee& though  federal troops  were called out repeatedly  to quell resistance  in the 
coalfields,  and though  statistical  studies ofjudicial  behavior  indicate that an unprecedented  wave 
of injunctions  crashed over unions in this period,  still, in coal and utilities wages held up rather 
well and then soon began to rise aga.in2’ On the railroads  (where the courts also repeatedly 
intervened,  v&ally  always on management’s  side), wages first fell, though  not by as much as in 
mant&&ring  nor nearly as much as in agriculture.  As the cycle turned up, railroad  wages rose 
very slightly (amid a wave of strikes). Following  the passage of the Railway Labor Act of  1926, 
which can be viewed as a precursor  of the Wagner Act, they rose more steeply until  1932. In the 
thirties, manufacturing  wage settlements  caught up with wages on the railways, and the  1920 
19 parities were restored  from  1937 to  1940. During World War II, however,  railroad  wage 
settlements  fell further and further behind (even though  the absolute  level of railroad  wages 
remained quite high). This outcome  might be hekl to reflect the long term decline of the railroads 
or the eventual  success ofthe  Railway Labor Act at incorporating  the unions  into the bargaining 
process,  or both. 
The recession  of 1920-22 hammer&  nominalwagesinheavymanulbcturingasweUasin 
textiles and garments,  though  neither  suffered as much as agriculture  and public roads.  However 
as Figure VII also shows, these sectors recovered  after taking a second beating,  like all other 
clusters, early in the Great Depression.  Our annual data also suggest that the recession  of 1938  -- 
the tirst downturn  in which the Federal government  employed a deliberately  counter  cyclical 
macn,policyonalargescale,accompaniedby~~broadminimumwagelaws,theFairLabor 
StandardsActsof1937and1938-  temporarilyhaitedtheriseinmanufac&ngwages,but 
nowhere  seriously reversed their c~urse.~ 
Then, as many studies including Gokhn and Margo (1991) have observed,  with World 
War II the great upward pull of demand began to operate  on the wage structure  as a whole. But 
the combined force of demand, mihtary enlistment  and risii  wage standards on the wages of 
unskilled farm workers,  still forty percent  of employment  in 1940, is especially dramatic.  This is 
the Great Compression  of the  1940s. By 1945 it had nearly erased the Great Decompression  of 
the early  1930s. 
Indeed,  by incIuding sectors beyond manu&cturing,  notabfy public roads and agriculture, 
and carrying our data back to  1920, our study sharpens the discussion of the effects of the New 
20 Deal and World War II on the wage structure.  The wage structure  that evolved  during the war 
-  essentially  represented  a restoration  ofthe  wage structure  that had briefly existed at the end ofthe 
previous  Great War, in 1920.  World War II’s Great Compression  was, in truth, the Second 
Great compression:  the first having occurred  in 1917-19. 27 
There is dramatic contrast  in how the two Great Compressions  played out. Though  our 
data end in 1947, we  know that the wage structure  carried on from that point,  with 
comparatively  minor changes,  for at least another  two decades. Egalitarian  by previous  standards 
andyetalsostable,thispostwarwagestnrcturesure~q~~asaverystrikingformof 
persistent  structme.  Like the Great Red Spot on the planet Jupiter,  it demands recognition  as an 
enduring phenomenon  in its own right. For those  inclined to view labor market  outcomes  as 
driven by &e  market  forces, this must inevitably  be discomforting.  What changes in, say,  the 
peacetime  labor force  or in civilian technology  occurring  strictly between  1940 and  1946 could 
possibly have accounted  for both the emergence  of the wartime wage structure  and its enduring 
stabi  a quarter  century  a&r  the war? 
Stage Ill:  Discriminant  Analysis 
In the third stage of our analysis, we apply discriminant  function  analysis to the eight 
clusters derived in the first stage. The technical  details are outlined  in Appendix 2, but the basic 
idea is straightforward.  Having previously  found the best (minimum variance)  chlstering  of 
industries into groups, we have groups that are as strongly differentiated  as any structure  of 
aggregation  based on wage behavior  will yield. The differences  between these groups thus contain 
21 most  of the economic  information  that may appear in the wage structure  overalL To extract  this 
information  in its most compact  form, we Gnd the set of canonical  roots  or eigenvectors  that best 
discriminates  the disparate pattems  of wage behavior  exhiiited  by the clusters. These eigenvectors 
are ranked  in importance  by their associated  eigentiues,  which measure the proportion  of inter- 
group variance explained by each. 
Our analysis yields four roots  that together  explain 97% of the variance  in the intergroup 
wage stnxture;  as noted  previously  the first two of these alone account  for 75% and the first one 
accounts  for over haE  Since the roots  are comprised  of year-specifk  weights, we can treat them 
as economic  time series in their own right.  Now, as explained earlier, the task is to try to 
determine  whether  these roots  correspond  to known variates  iu the historical  record. 
The First Root  and the Movement  of Aggregate  Demand 
Figure VIII presents the distribution  of factor  scores on the first canonical  root,  which we 
plot here against the cumulative  change in nominal wages Corn 1920 through  1939.  A remarkable 
association  emerges. Activities  scoring above zero on this root  showed relatively  high and 
uniform cumulative  wage gaius through  this period; industries scoring below ixro  show 
cumulative  wage gains that are progressively  lower as the score declines. 
A possible, albeit post  hoc, explanation  emerges when one considers the identity of the 
groups splayed across the figure.  Agriculture  and textiles were low-wage,  competitive  sectors; 
the former remained un-unionized  throughout  the period  and the latter substantially  so until the 
early- to mid- 1930s; these are industries that Dunlop (1957) long ago identified as heavily 
22 dependent  on unskilled labor.  Road wages, as previously  discussed, were kept tied to those  in 
agricuhure  fbr political  reasons until the New DeaL In contrast,  in mass production,  in the capital 
goods  sector and in railroads  and utilities wages were comparatively  high, workers  comparatively 
organized  and firms monopolistic.  Capital goods production  natumhy  rises and fhhs with gross 
investment;  to some extent so does the mass production  of consumers’  durable goods. 
We therefore  hypothesize  that the di&rences  in scores across sectors may reflect 
differences in the ability of workers  to capture  the benefits of increasing aggregate  demand, 
somethnrg akin to industry-specific  labor rents or a pass-through  from Kale&i’s  famous degree of 
monopoly power?  This thought  motivates  a search for a proxy for the movement  of aggregate 
demand. of  course, the most reasonable  of these is also the most easily obtained:  estimates  of the 
movement  of Gross National  Product.  Figure IX plots the yearly values of our fhst root  (scaled 
for expositional  clarity) against the annual rate of change of nominal GNP as recorded  by Robert 
J. Gordon  (1986). 
Magnitudes  and timing do not accord precisely  -- it may be that aggregate  supply factors 
affect GNP in some periods,  lags as well as interdependencies  in both directions  are possible,  and 
it may be that relative wages sometimes responded  to the movemenf  of reaI as opposed  to 
nominal GNP.  But we believe the general correspondence  between these two series is &king; 
considering  that one series is constructing  from gross expenditures  on goods  and services, while 
the other  is extracted  from a matrix of changes in relative wage rates.  The simple correlation 
coefficient  between the two series is .41; we think it is an understatement.2g 
23 The Second Root:  Strikes? 
The second root  accounts  for 20 percent  of the variance  in the intergroup  wage structure. 
Following  previous  procedure,  Figure X  plots scores along this  root  against cumulative  wage 
change in the interwar years.  The ranking  isolates textiles and roads at the high end of the 
spectrum, farm workers  at the bottom  end.  Mass production,  railroads  and capital goods hold the 
middle ground,  with utilities ranking below them.  Notably,  while the very low ranking  farm 
sector  showed the lowest wage gains, the highest ranking sectors  do not show the greatest  gains. 
Railroads,  heavy mant&ctur&  and mass production  industries were all heavily unionized 
by the end of this period. Although  textiles were not unionized  in the South, the Conference 
Board  data we use are drawn heavily from Northern  mills, and these became unionized  in the 
great drives of the early  1930s.  Agriculture  and public roads, in contrast,  were esse&aUy un- 
unionized,  but the wage behavior  in roadbuikliq  was altered dramatically  during this period,  as 
we have seen, by a political  decision.3o 
It thus seems plausible that this root  is capturing,  not the degree of labor power  but the 
change in it, the relative degree of labor militancy across sectors.  A suitable proxy for this may be 
the total  number of days lost to strikes, particularly  strikes that ended in labor victories  or in 
compr~mise.~~ This information  is plotted  against the second root  in Figure XI. Though  the 
match is again imperfect, the two  series share a pattern;  both show the abrupt upsurge of the early 
1930s and again at the end of World War Two. Once again  there is a sign&ant  positive 
correlation  between them (rho=O.35). Correlations  to measures of  total  work  stoppages  and the 
number of workers  involved  are even higher:  .40 and .46, respectively.  Figure XII illustrates. 
24 It does not, of course,  follow that a high ranking  on this root  produces  the highest overall 
rates of wage gain  The root  only captures  20 percent  of the intergroup  variation;  its effects are 
therefore  dominated  by those of the first root.  Textile wage gains overall were low, though  textile 
workers  were militant; though  railroad  workers  were less mibnt  over the whole period  railroad 
wage gains were high.  Still, overall  these figures suggest quite clearly that strikes and related 
political  decisions made a Merence,  particularly  in separating the wage performance  in unionized 
textiles  from those on the f 
The Third  Root:  Terms of Trade and Exchange Rates 
The first two roots  explain 75% of the total  variance. But there is a third root  that 
accounts  for another  15 percent.  Again following  protocol,  we plot in Figure XIII the canonical 
scores on this root  against cumulative  interwar wage change, and notice  that now mass 
production,  textiles,  capital goods and utilities all rank high, while Grms, roads and railroads  rank 
low.  Can it be that this root  is picking up the influence of trade in manufactured  commodities? 
Figure XIV puts this hypothesis  to a prekminary  test, by plotting  a version of the tbird 
root  in index number form against an index of crude food to man&ctured  import prices, and an 
index of total  import values.  The family resemblance  is not bad; the sharp 63ll  in imports that 
accompanied  the outbreak  of war in Europe  is telling.  But we have found something  even better: 
the exchange rate against sterling and the yen -- the latter particularly  important  63r textile trade 
owing to competition  between rayon and silk.  Figure XV presents these comparisons;  once again 
there are significant correlations,  of 0.25 against sterling and 0.44  against the yen. 
25 Looking  back at the scatter plot in light of this evidence,  only utilities  seem curiously  out 
of place. Leontief  s famous study of the interwar  economy  Feontiec  1951, pp.  178E]  observed 
that while direct exports from this sector were modest,  it protited  strongly  from its customers’ 
growth.  By contrast,  wages on roads and raihoads  often zigged as the (in the twenties,  usually 
improving)  international  economy  zagged. And while one normally thinks of American agriculture 
as a successful export  industry,  in the interwar period this bromide was just close enough to the 
truth to be seriously misleading. Many crops dominant  in certain regions  -  for example, many 
dairy products  or fresh vegetables  -  were not traded at all, or on only a very small scale (save in 
the form of canned goods).  Others were scarcely competitive  with imports at any price, and 
sought (and received)  tatSprotection.  More internationally  competitive  crops,  such as wheat, 
cotton,  or tobacco,  all too  frequently  faced shrink&  foreign markets  as governments  around the 
workl  sought to protect  their agricultural  producers  from competitors  through  a wide variety  of 
tarif& and direct controls.” 
The Fourth  Root:  A Mystery? 
At this point, just ten percent  of cross-cluster  variation  remains, and our analysis reveals a 
fourth root  that explains seven percentage  point  of that.  This root  is not so easy to identify. Figure 
XVI shows that utilities ranked highest on this root;  combined with Figure XVII’s choppy 
downward  trend after  1925 this suggests to us that it might perhaps reflect the long-term 
structural transition  of the economy  from coal to oil. But we have no historical  series with which 
to test this thought,  and for the time being we leave the question  open. 
26 But What About Education  and the Increasing  Supply of Skill? 
Goldin~Margo(1991)aradGoldin~Katz(1995)~eo~~argumentsfor 
believing that education  and perhaps technological  change played important  roles in the 
movement  toward  greater equality of wages in this period  Erom  the early thirties to the end of 
World War Two. They argue that the increasing supply of high school  graduates,  in particular, 
increased competition  for skilled jobs,  depressed  skill differentials  and compressed  the wage 
structure.  Several empirical analyses involving certain  specialized occupational  groups,  such as 
clerks in New York State and railroad  machinists, appear to lend weight to this claim. 
Education  plays no appamnt  role in our analysis at all  Why not? Considering  the 
importanceof  thisissueforpolicy,itisworthaskingwhetherthereissoatethinginourmetlaods 
that might mask the inf&nce  of an educational  effect on labor supply.  For example, might 
education  somehow  resemble immigmtion,  which, because it was sharply cut down at the 
beginning of the period  with which we are concerned,  might have effects unlikely to be detected 
by a method that operates  on rates of wage changes from year to yearP3  Is there perhaps 
something  about between-group  comparisons  of  industries that mufnes an effect observable  in 
micro data?  Or is it possible, as one referee has suggested to us, that entirely separate 
determinams  can drive the year-to-year  movement  of relative wages on the one hand and the 
long-term  trend of di@erentials on the other? 
The first possibii  can be excluded.  The trend in total  school enrollments  is well 
documented;  its plot shows a gently rising trends,  save during the Depression  and World War II. 
The rise in the number of workers  who had completed  high school, perhaps the most  relevant 
27 construct  for a measure of labor supply, is even steadier,  falling only during World War II.  Thus 
changes in the educational  status were happening  continuously  over the perk+  education  was not 
like immig&on” 
Nor  is it likely that we are being misled because by our data. Unlike researchers  using 
Census or other  individual level data, we do not have direct evidence on intra-industty  wage 
variations.  But for a theory  of wages driven by rising or falling di&rentials  in education  to hold 
up, given our evidence,  it would be necessary to show that intra-industry education diiS=ntials 
rose (or fell) in ways not consistent wit& aud not explained by,  the forces governing  movements 
of the inter-group wage structure (which we consider to be fully explained, as of now, by the four 
forces we identify). This would require large mean-preserving sEfks in the distribution  of wages 
within industries, which would w  have occurred  without  also disturbing the inter- 
industry and inter-group  structures.  Put bluntly, the forces driving wages within groups would 
have to be radically di&rent  from those responsible  for the between-group  diEerences  that we 
have ana@zed. 
This is very improbable.  We employ a diverse set of time series collected  from difhxent 
sources and at widely difKng  levels of aggregation,  and include a full set of occupational  wages 
for one industry, namely railroads,  marked by wi&  differences  in skill levels. Yet these various 
parts moved together.  Further,  no one argues that more educated  workers  were randomly 
distributed  across all of American industry. From the late twenties  forward,  they were 
concentrated  in newer industries,  including many with a distinct orientation  toward  technology. 
What might in some industries register mostly as within-group  differences,  accordingly,  should in 
28 other  cases also lead to easily detectable  differences between  groups,  corresponding  to 
movemeIlfs of the skill-to-unskihed  diEerentiaL35 
But not only don’t we pick up such di&ences,  some of our findings are incompatible 
with their existence. In Figure III, we show that in most industries the movement  of the skill-to- 
unskSddif&entialfortheperiodfiom1920to  1937islessthanthewagevariationbetweenthat 
industry and even its near neighbors.  Most of the important  wage variation  was inter-indusuial, 
not across skill levels.  It is true that  skill is not quite the same thing as educatios  and that the 
Conference  Board’s measurement,  which differentiates  only the wholly unskilIed from everyone 
else, is crude.  Nevertheless,  even this crude distinction  was surely correlated  with education 
levels, and as Figure XVIII  illustmtes,  the movement  in the skill-to-unskihed  differentials  in most 
industries was small.  The printing trades were, conceivably,  an exception  -- but ifso  they were a 
minor one in the larger scheme of industrial wages. 
Finally, we reject the argument that long-term  trends can somehow  supersede the patterns 
detected  in our analysis.  This argument  amounts  essentially to a claim that the endpoints  of an 
arbii  chosen time period  can be explained without  reference to the events occurring  in 
between.  We don’t think so.  The inter-industry  wage movements  we identify occurred,  and we 
think they occurred  because of particular  movements  of aggregate  demand, labor action,  and 
exchange rates. Had these movements  been different,  so too  we believe would have been the 
major variations  of relative wages.  To show an effect of education  on these movements,  one 
must therefore  show either that one of our identifications  is incorrect,  or that changing  skill levels 
controlled  one of our three identified proximate  causes. 
29 Neither  seems  likely. Our ~IMBSWS  of the main forces on intergroup  wage variation  do not 
exhibit gently rising trends.  Rather, they are subject to  sharp discontinuities  and even to reversals. 
None appears to be a plausible proxy fbr changing education  difErentials.  And collectively  they 
just  about exhaust the intm  variation  ofthe  wage structure. 
To deny the existence of an “education  effect” on wages in this period does not imply that 
the “premium” paid to high school or college educated  was  invariant.  Instead,  it segregates 
effects of the evolving  composition  of the labor force from changes in the composition  of jobs  on 
of&r. More educated  people qua&d,  to be sure, for better jobs,  as Table A4 in Goklin and Katz 
(1995) demonstrates.  Following  theii  logic, one might expect that supply pressures emerging at 
the upper end of the labor market would have systematically  depressed  skill premia throughout 
the twenties  and especially in the thirties,  when good jobs were scarce. But this would happen 
even ifthe  wage structure  -- the pattern  of payrmxits for particular  lines of work -  had mmained 
unchzmged. It would bqpen,  inevitably,  simply because lower-wage jobs would increasirrgly f5.U 
to over-educated  workers.  The effect of an increased supply of educated  labor on the wage 
structure  itselfwould  emerge onl’  if  employers responded  to the increased supply of education  by 
reducing wage rates fbr skilled positions. 
Figures III and  XVIII present  demon&rations  that this did not general@ occur; ifit  had, 
the skilled labor components  of various  industries woukl have clustered  in a slower growing 
group,  instead of alongside  their respective  industries.  But Goklin and Katz did not firad  any such 
pattern  either,  in their data skill premia were depressed  sharply in both wars, but during the 
interwar period  skill premia displayed little variation  (Goldin and Katz,  1995, Tables 5,6,  and 7). 
30 Goklin and Margo  (1991), on the other hand, do report  that certain  l%irly  narrow  groups 
of relatively  educated  workers,  notably  clerks in Class I steam railroads  and office workers  in 
New York  State, experienced  a pattern  of increasing returns to their educated  status in the late 
twenties  and early thirties,  Mowed  by sharp and continuing  declines thereafter  (Goldin and 
Margo,  1991).  From these  1930s declines come, it appears, the foundation  of  the argument  that 
the increased relative supply of skilled workers  drove down the premium to education  through  the 
nineteen  thirties  and forties. 
Our Figure XVIII  directly addresses the question  of how much within-industry  variation 
inskill~~e~thereactuallywasinthelargereconomyduringthisperiod.Theansweris: 
‘hot  very much.” Only a kw  cases -- hosiery and knitting,  newspapers  and magazines, and 
construction  -- display perceptl%le patterns  of change. In the event that the bumps in the Goldin- 
Margo  data for clerks in New York are, indeed, intra-industrial  in character,  this figure 
demonstrates  that they are quite  atypical of intra-industrial  di&rentials  between unskilled and 
skilled workers.  From  1920 through  1937, the average change across all indust&s  was an 
increase  in skill premia of about 6 percent  -- not particularly  consistent  with the hypothesis  of 
excess supply of skilled labor -- and most industries are within a HEW  points  of that figure.  While 
the exceptions  mentioned  above stand out, overall there is no perceptible  association  across 
industries between increases in the proportion  of skilled positions  and changes  in the skill 
premium 
What then of the Goldin-Margo  &ding  that  &ill premiums declined Tom the early thirties 
through  the  194Os? The answer is now f&irly  clear: the particular  series for clerical workers 
31 chosen by Goldin and Margo do not reflect the broader  pattern  of skill premia. They mainly 
reflect, we think_.  the general improvement  of the position  of the common  laborer brought  about 
by the New Deal and, eventually,  tight labor markets during World War II. We suspect, in other 
words, that the Goldin-Margo  series simply mirrors the inter-i&triuZ  trends that  our  paper has 
already identified. 
Figure XIX presents the Goldin-Margo  data fix  railroad  clerks, relative to laborers,  and 
of railroad  machinists,  again relative to laborers. Against this series, we plot a ratio indicating  the 
relative  wage in railroads  as opposed  to that in our “mass productior.Pchtster.  The simila&y  of 
movement  is pronounced.  Gur interpretation  is that railroad  workers,  who were highly skilled on 
average relative to the common run of factory  workers,  sufhued  a decline in relative position  due 
to the general improvement  of the comtnon  laborer’s lot after  1933. Goldin and Margo  have, we 
believe, merely measured an element ofthis  general trend, which is already distinct in our inter- 
industrydata.M 
Figure XX takes up the second Goklin-Margo  series, fbr clerks in New York State, and 
compares  it to the ratio of the average wage in the industrial cluster that includes books  and 
utilities, divided by the fhrm wage.  Gnce more, the three  series are very similar, allowing for the 
fact that Goldin and Margo  use of average weekly eumings  rather than hourly wages may 
account for the relatively  sharp spike in the clerk’s relative position  in 1929-32.  But again  the 
sovereign  fbct, easily confirmed  by examining what moved and what didn’t in our Figure IV 
(particularly,  f&n  wages as against utilities),  is that it is the wages ofthe  unskilled, not those of 
the clerks, that are the real story in this picture. 
32 Goklin and M&go’s own data cc&h  that movements  in the wages of the unskilled 
dominate  in the hctuations  in the ratio of clerical-to-unskilled  wages. From  1923 to their peak in 
1930, the weekly eamings  of clerical workers  in New York  state rose  17 percent.  From  193 1 to 
the trough  in 1933, wages in this group fell 16 percent  -  to just  below their  1923 values. But 
weekly earnings for unskilled workers  fell by 41 percent  from their peak in 1929 to the trough  in 
1932!  This is what gives the GoldinMargo  series for clerks its sharp upward thrust,  and it is the 
subsequent rise in laborers’ earnings -  54 percent by 1937 -  tbat brings the ratio back down 
again. 
One final point.  During World War Two, the enormous  in wages of the truly unskilled 
workers  who toiled  in agricuhure  and on the public roads owed nothing  to any  Roads 
Scholarships  program.  The spectacular  rise in their wages was the e&t,  surely, of demand, 
spurred by record public deficits, and the absorption  of some ten million men into uniformed 
government  employment.  And the result was an almost perfect  inversion of Protestant  ideology 
and conventional  thhking  about education  and labor markets,  for the prime beneficiaries  cerhnly 
included many millions of workers  who were functionally  illiterate and possessed of the very 
lowest educational  credentials  of alL3’ And yet, and yet, it was this wage structure,  socially 
constructed  in national  emergency though  it was, that persisted  for a generation  following  the 
War. 
33 Stage IV: Explaining the Evolution  of Wage Inequality  as a Whole 
To conclude  our analysis, we abandon  clustering  and disc&&@  functions  and return to 
our original data set. With some compression,  so as to match our wage data to  1940 data on 
employment  and thus to get employment  weights for each industry,  and with some 
approximations  (mainly filling in a few years of missing wage data here and there,  by 
interpolation),  we can compute  a single annual index of inequality  in the wage structure. 
To be precise, we have calculated  the between-groups  component  of Theil T statistic,  a 
well-known  measure of inequality,  for the 83 industries in our sample, by averaging  them into 26 
major groups and using  1940 employment  weights j?orn the Historical Statistics of the United 
States. Figure XXI displays the result.  As noted previously,  Appendix  1.4 gives details. As an 
absolute measure of wage inequality,  our measure meanslittle.  Butasa  measure of changes in 
ixleq*  it tums  out  to  be  very  interesting  indeed. 
Clearly, the time path of this statistic  does not square with any argument  based on gentle 
changes.Outestimaterisesin1920-21,~toaplateauinthel~Os,risessharplyin~Great 
Depression,  and only comes down again, in a dramatic rush, during World War Two. 
Figure XXII adjusts our inequality measure by a Moor  of 200 br  visual comparison  and 
reveals clearly what does track inequality  in the wage sbucture:  the unemployment  rate.  In a 
regression  using only one variable, unemployment  accounts  for 83 percent  of the variation  in the 
Theil statistic.  (Appendix 4 provides  details).  It is worth noting that we are looking  here at and 
the dispersion  of wages among the employed.  The falling incomes of the unemployed  have no 
direct effect on the computation  of this particular  inequality  statistic. 
34 What  then is  the contribution  of the forces associated  with the canonical  roots  to the 
movement  of wage inequality as a whole?  There is no reason aprioti  for clear associations  to 
exist, for two reasons.  First, the between-group  Theil statistic is employment-weighted,  while our 
clusters are not; it could be that major variations  across cheers,  picked up by the discriminant 
functions,  affected only small groups of workers  and therefore  carried little impact on the Theil 
statistic.  Seco&  even where some force significantly affects cross-cluster  differentials,  it may or 
may not tiect  the overall dispersion  of wages, depending  on whether  initial differences  in average 
wage levels between the clusters are large or smalL3* 
A reasonable  first test of the in&ence  of our canonical  forces on inequality  is simply to 
add the variable most strongly  correlated  to each canonical  root  to the Theil regression.  For the 
&st  root  we have two potential  proxies of equal power,  and no strong apriori  reason to prefer 
one over the other, they are the change of nominal GNP, and change in unemployment.  We use 
total  workers  involved  in strikes as our proxy for the second root,  and the foreign exchange  index 
for Japan for the third.  We would expect the signs apriori  to be positive  for GNP growth, 
negative  for the change in unemployment,  and negative  again for the strike variable. It appears 
from our earlier anaIysis that high growth  rates benetited  relatively  high-wage  workers  -- because 
the surge of investment  would raise the incomes of construction,  capital goods,  and durable- 
goods  producers  --  while strikes benefited relatively  less-well-paid workers.  For the sign of the 
exchange rate variable we have no theoretical  prediction,  for that would depend on the particular 
pattern  of trade relations  between the U.S. and Japan, as well as the extent to which the US/Japan 
exchange rate may have tracked  rates with other countries  for which we do not have data. 
35 Unempkqment  raises inequality  and again does most of the work in these equations.  The 
growth  of GNP or the change in unemployment,  on the other hand, have the expected  effects: 
initially, increases in aggregate  demand increase ineqe,  it is only with sust&ed  high 
employment  that inequality declines.  We are inclined to take both results as continuing 
confirmation  of the primacy of aggregate  demand ef%cts on the wage structure. 
To our surprise, given the independent  power  of the unemployment  variable, the 
coefficients  on both the labor and dollar/yen  variables are also significant in this regression,  with 
negative  coefficients.  The labor variable thus exhibits the correct  sign; we have no interpretation 
for the sign of the exchange rate index.  Overall, the regressions  explain around  95 percent  of the 
variance in the Theil stat&tic.  Durbin Watson  statistics do indicate serial correlation  in the 
residuals; we therefore  caution  against over-interpreting  the significance of our T-statistics.. 
The historical  picture this analysis suggests is straightforward.  At the end of World War I, 
the structure  of wages in the American economy  resembled what it woukl look  like almost a 
generation  later (or, for that matter, two generations  later). But a&r  the brief post-war  boom this 
relatively  egalitarian  wage alignment disintegrated,  under the hammer blow of the recession  of 
1920-22, when unemployment  soared.  A recovery  in the early  1920s led to a plateau  for the rest 
of that decade, until the Great Crash of 1929. 
The Depression  of  1929-32 drove inequality upwards, as the low wage farm sector,  still 
forty percent  of all employment,  collapsed.  The dollar depreciation  in 1933 exacerbated  this 
effect, though  as we argued it may also have contributed  to the rise of labor militancy, which 
36 worked  to reduce inequality  -- however  the effects of this force mmained  swamped by 
unemployment.  Only the 111 employment  policies and direct controls  of World War II, 
accompanied  by a strong movement  for greater wage equality within the trade union movement, 
returned  the wage structureby1946tosomethinglike,andactually~reegalitarianthan,ithad 
been in 1920. 
Indeed,  so powerful  was the wartime rise in the lowest wages that the whole labor market 
began to change in ways not well captured  by our study. It is well known that as the price of 
unskilled labor rocketed  upward, employers  began accepting  and in many instances recruiting  new 
sources of unskilled labor. Depending  on the nature of the work process,  the location  of 
production,  and other variables, they began to hire larger numbers of women  Negroes,  Mexicans 
and Puerto  Ricans as these groups were then called. In effect, sustained full employment 
restructured  the market for un&lled  labor. And many of its biggest beneficiaries  were groups  that 
had been largely excluded &om both manufacturing  employment  and education  before the War 
(Haddy and Tolles,  1957):’ 
And yet, and yet:  despite its artiscial,  govemmen t-inspired  and policy-driven  origins in a 
temporary  emergency,  the World War II wage alignment persisted.  Instead  of deh’berately 
engineering  a recession,  as the Federal Reserve Board did in 1920-21, policy makers after World 
War II managed to avoid the worst macroeconomic  mistakes of the earlier period.  Encouraged 
by the postwar  strike wave, the spread of Keynes’ views, the beginning of the Cold War and later 
the war in Korea, they maintained  high levels of aggregate  demand and employment  nearly 
consistently  for 25 years, ifrarely  attaining  ‘full employment.” 
37 Theorists  who see this process as importantly  driven by education  and changing  skill levels 
are, we believe, in danger of  putting  the cart before the horse.  The G.I. Bills came at the very end 
of the period we are concerned  with, and the National  De&nse Education  Acts and Great Society 
education  programs  lay f$r in the future. For all the success of the public schools,  access to 
education  between  1921 and 1947 remained very f&r  from equaL Indeed,  though  the question 
would require another  paper, it seems likely that the vast increase in education  levels that 
fbllowed the war owed much to the prior leveling of the wage structure  and the new political 
structures  engendered  by the New DeaL  And we suspect that those  business groups who 
accepted  the G.I. Bills but worked  hard to prevent  the Employment  Act of 1946 Corn becoming 
what its original  sponsors  intended -  the Full Employment  Act of 1946 -  well understood  that 
the  Weltknoten could be unravekxL40 They had already grasped what our study has told us. 
They knew that no public policies work  so reliably to reduce inequality  as the dehtite, 
simultaneous  effort to combine Ml  employment  with collective  bargaining rights and rising wage 
standards. 
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1.  The  persist-  of the mid-to  late forties wage structure  and the role of pattern 
bargains are widely acknowledged,  see, e.g., Gokhn and Margo,  1991, p. 1, who  cite Thurow, 
1975,p.lll.  SeealsoEcksteinandWilson(1962)andMaher(1961a)audourcommentsbelow 
on the “Great Red Spot.” Various analys& date the decay of that wage sttuchm  differently,  but 
no one known to us any longer disputes the fact of that decline. 
2. For reasons of space, the remainder of this essay collects as many references  as possible 
in a single footnote  at the end of each pamgraph.  A good,  if  sometimes  curiously  selective, 
overview of recent work in English on inter-war  wage adjustment  and the controversies  over 
relief  is Eichengreen,  1992.  See esp. pp. 2 16-2 18. See also Eichengreen  and Hatton,  1988 and 
Borchardt,  1991, Chapters9,10,11.  Wallis, 1989,  isanotherinteresting  amlysis  ofthereliefand 
wages controversy  in the US. 
3. Our dating of  the earlier wave of wage structure  studies follows Dunlop,  1988, p. 58; 
the second wave of wage studies now includes a huge number of papers.  See, e.g., the references 
39 in Goblin and Margo,  1991. On  the  notion  of “wage structure”  see the classic reference  by Ross, 
1957. 
4. Compare  Cullen,  1956; Backman and Gainsbrugh,  1948, Shchter,  1950; Reder,  1962 
(especiallyp.  269); Bell 1951; Lebergott,  1947; Keat,  1960; Maher,  1961% and Dunlop,  1988. 
While not an inter-industry  study, Ober, 1948 also contains  much of interest. 
5. Some of these differences,  as the investigators  quickly realized, were artifacts  of data or 
method.  Rank orderings  of industries, for example, usually looked  more stable than alignments 
founded  on ratio  or interval measures such as absolute difErences  in cents per hour.  The common 
technique  (which we, too,  employ in our study) of tracing  levels of wages  in a consistent  set of 
industries over a generation  or more may mislead, by leaving out of account  new industries that 
arose during the period  or older ones that collapsed.  Still, the fhst wave of wage structure  studies 
topped  out without  resolving  how much of a difference  such difTerences ultimately  made. See 
especially,  Cullen  1956, which is quite complete.  Note that a study like ours, which covers barely 
a generation,  runs a much smaller risk of omitting  important  industries than studies spanning 
longer periods. 
6. See Haddy and Tolles,  1957; by comparison,  Haddy and Currell,  1958 is more 
conventional.  Reder,  1957, pp. 276ff. brings out  particularly  clearly the neoclassical  l%ame  of 
reference  in which most of these discussions moved. Discussions  of market power  did 
predominate  in regard to one subject: labor unions, on which a vast literature  arose.  See, e.g., 
Lewis,  1962. 
7. See Goldin and Margo,  1991; Goldin and Katz,  1995; in regard to the role of education, 
40 the former is quite reserved,  though  suggestive. 
8. Useful cautions  appear  in Dunlop,  1988, Slichter,  1950, especially its sobering note  1; 
Douglas,  1930; for geography,  see especially Earle,  1993. For a review of data broken  down by 
gender,  see Goklin,  1990; in regard to race, see Sundstrom,  1993; for both race and gender,  see 
also Amott  & Matthaei,  1991.  Note  that during most of our period,  fringe and supplemental 
benefits were quite unimportant  as factors  in compensation.  They began to appear in some 
contracts  in the late thirties,  and became more important  as a way around  wage controls  during 
World War II. In the post-war  period,  they certainly  bulked rather  larger, though  by no means 
covering  the whole labor force.  See the discussion and data presented  in Lewis,  1963, pp. 234ff. 
For this paper it is impossible to believe that neglecting  them -  which all analysts known  to us 
perforce  have to do, since available statistics are meager -- could possibly make much difference, 
since our cutoff  is 1947. It is interesting  to note that economists  writing about this period have 
usually been clear on this point,  despite a vast literature  by historians  on the “welfare capitalism+’ 
of  the twenties.  The pathetically  limited character  of this movement  is obvious  in, for example, 
Lewis’ data. 
9. For Dunlop,  see e.g, his (1957); among recent  works on business history,  see especially 
Jacoby,  1985; Cbandler,  1962; and Lazonick,  1991; Katz and Summers,  1989. 
10. Not  wishing to waste available numbers, we include two composite  series in the 83: 
one for the average wage on all public roads, and the other  for the average of 25 manutacturing 
industries as computed  by the Conference  Board.  Though  redund&t  with the other data in the 
figure, they are useful markers and their inclusion does no harm. 
41 11.Itisreasonabletoask~wsensitivetheseandotherresuEtspresentedinthispaperare 
to slight variations  in our methods.  Two issues in particular  may provoke  concern:  our reliance on 
annual data and the particular  time period we chose to analyze. Would our results differ 
significantly  if  either ofthese  varied? Our attention  was drawn to the m  possiii  by John 
Dunlop,  who asked us how our methods  would register  industries which were in fact patterning 
their wage settlements  after each other,  but only after a lapse of some time (as for example, when 
the lagging industry’s contract  expired early in the following  year).  Several points  seem important 
here. First, while some non-unionized  industries may have been informally tracking  each other, 
very few of the industries we analyze had formal union contracts  during most of the period  we 
anafyzeinthispaper.Whileitiseasyto~e~casesinw~hanindustrywhose 
contracts  expire in February follows another  industry that settles in November,  such cases could 
not be regular events without  long term contracts.  More commonly,  especially in a predominantly 
non-union  era, informal pattern  bargaining figures to distribute randomly  throughout  the year, or 
over the business cycle, which would cause no persisting problems with our methods.  Neither 
woti  the processes  discussed by Mehra,  1976, p. 307, in which not formal pattern  bargains, but 
similarly interacting  product  and labor markets produce  the correlated  wage changes. 
Nevertheless,  this possibility  still worried us. Fortunately,  NICB data for most of the 
man-  industries in our data set are available on a monthly  basis between  1920 and  1937. 
Such data inevitably will be very noisy. But when we analyzed all the industries for which 
complete  monthly  data exist  (our methods  are sensitive to missing data) only two industries 
switched positions  from where they placed according  to annual data over the same time period  -- 
42 and there  is reason to believe that  these industries were afKected  by the accidental  termination  of 
our series in the middle of a strike wave (one was rubber). One should also note that while 
possibilities  like these occasioned  much discussion in the post-war  literature  over pattern 
bargaining,  no actual argument  over which industries were act&y  in a hypothesized  pattern  ever 
seems to have turned on this question.  Compare the discussions  in Ross,  1957; Maher,  l%la  and 
196 lb; Mehra,  1976; E&stein  and Wilson,  1962, where the discussions  focus on simple &lures 
to include particular  industries in samples. (This is not our problem,  since every industry for which 
we have data is in the sample.) Note  also that while our di&rent  time period  inevitably 
distinguishes  our results from those  of analysts who concentrated  on post-war  pattern  bargains, 
our data for the forties di&rs  little from traditional  accounts  of the pattern  In regard to the time 
period,  see the discussion below in regard to the emergence  of pattern  bargaining.. 
12. True, the eponymous  hero was in fact a coal miner. But he worked  in an economy 
whose degree of vertical integration  would have been the envy of Carnegie or Frick. And it was 
the heavy industrial complex, not the coal mine, that captured  imaginations. 
13. For the political  economy  of various  sectors and groups of firms in the inter-war 
period  see Ferguson,  1995% the key point  is that many protectionist  firms did some exporting  into 
particular  regions even as they argued strenuously  for taxi&  in their home market.  During most of 
the period, the decisive political  cleavage lay between &ms that were truly successful 
multinationals  or exporters,  and those  that weren’t; their comparative  statuses fluctuated  with the 
world economy. 
14. Compare the various economic  criteria discussed in, e.g., Mebra,  1976, Ross,  1957, or 
43 E&stein  and Wilson,  1962. 
15. JusthowhinhhrdevelopedthepatternbecameissuggestedinMaher,  l%laand 
1961b. On the contriiution  of unions,  see also So&,  1959 and Mehra,  1976. A consistent 
application  of the latter’s viewpoint  would lead to important  mod&ations  of the “labor rents” 
view. 
16. For complaints  during the Depression,  see,  e.g., Wyckoe  1946. For the correctness 
of the complaints  in the South,  see Alston  and Ferrie,  1985. 
17.Thedatafortheskilledandunskilledmalesaswellasthedataformenandwo~in 
manui&tGng  come l?om the NICB; see Appendix 2, which also indicates the source of the 
construction  data. 
18. Note  that the restricted  sample of industries and different period  of coverage  assure 
that the resulting clusters differ from those in Figure I. 
19. Besides the sources listed in Appendix 2, see also the table in Woytinsky,  1942, p. 
169, for one set of statistics illustrating  the dZ&ing  percentages  of women in various industries 
during the  1930s. The segmentation  ofjobs  by gender within industries is obvious  is many case 
studies. See, e.g., Gabin,  1990, pp.  12fX 
20. The key role of unions either in the textile industry, or very closely tied to it, is 
apparent  in all accounts  of the fixmation  of the CIO. Along with the United Mine Workers,  the 
International  Ladies Garment Workers  Union and the Amalgamated  Clothing  Workers  of America 
appear to have been the biggest investors  in the early drive for what became the CIO. See the 
brief discussion of the early Glancing  in Zieger,  1995, p. 23 as well as the discussion  in Galenson, 
44 1960, Chapter I). The much smaller United Textile Workers  and (parts of) the Hatter,  Cap and 
Millinery Worker  also figured in this effort.  (Zieger,  1995, p. 24). 
21. For the long decline of textiles  since World War I, see, e.g., Galambos,  1966 as well as 
the discussion  of the Taylor  Society and the New Deal in Ferguson,  1995, pp.  137-38. On the 
Japanese export  drive in textiles,  see, e.g., Matsui,  1958, pp. 50-54, and Wright,  1995. Note that 
in many instances,  cheaper Japanese imports of higher quality products  (e.g., silks) were 
squeezing  lower grade American products,  such as rayons.  This sort of pressure does not always 
register  in standard trade  statis&  organized  by particular  product  lines. 
There is no reason to overstate  a good case: There is no question  that the full force of 
devaluation  was stayed, not least by conservative  monetary  policy (Eichengreen,  1992, pp. 342- 
47; though  we would analyze the whole episode rather differently).  Also, as discussed below, the 
prevalence  of high tari&  and exchange controls  in the rest of the world inevitably  limited the 
success of U.S. exports.  The prospect  of cartelization  -  the inner meaning of the NRA -  also 
probably held a special attraction  ibr the long depressed textile industry.  The inventory  boom that 
accompanied  the early days of the NRA (as many Grms sought to restock  before prices rose) and 
the admi&ration’s  slowly moving plans for unfreezing  bank assets and increased public works 
spending no doubt also helped fire up indtis  -  and their workers  -- with visions of potential 
profits.  But in a world of depreciated  currencies,  devaluation  was helpful to many industries 
seeking to reclaim the home market,  ifnot  the rest of the world  particularly  from Japanese 
competitors. 
22. For the geographical  overlap between  some of the militant coal mining areas and 
45 textiles,  see Montgomery,  1994, p.344-45  and Bernstein,  1970, pp. 76-77. Montgomery  notes the 
wiklcat  nature of many of the early  1933 strikes and indicates that the link with textiles  was 
strongest  in the anthracite  region.  That our own data series for coal mining is for biius  coal 
is irrelevant  in this context:  both areas were in an uproar  and strongly  affected by the UMW, data 
specifically for the anthracite  regions  showing parallel wage movements  in this period  cau be 
found in (Commerce,  U.S.D.o.,  1936, p. 33).  Foner (1980, p. 286)  also mentions  an overlap 
between textiles and mining in parts of the South.  These latter mines probably  were bituminous; 
note that  in this period while southern  textiles workers  were not strikiq  with anything  like the 
frequency  of their northern  counterparts,  the (less comprehensive)  data indicate that their wages 
were rising, too. 
Given the critical role played by the “all&x”  between the Mine Workers  and the unions 
in textiles (broadly  construed),  John L. Lewis’s own attitudes  toward  women were plausibly of 
real importance  to the workings  of devaluation.  WhiIe Lewis and other UMW leaders 
undoubtedly  shared some attitudes  toward  womens’ social roles that could charitably  be tmned 
“Victor&”  (D&o&y  and Van Tine, p. 201) and the CIO was never likely to be confused  with 
the Women’s Trade Union League (Gabii  1990), Kenneally  (198 1, p.  164) observes that Lewis 
had long been an annual contributor  to the Women’s Trade Union League,  “vigorously’ 
. 
supported  the equal pay movement  in the NR4  codes, and in a New York Tm  interview 
committed  the new CIO to equal pay for “substantially  the same work.”  See also Foner,  1979, 
especially p. 320-22. 
For the investment  approach  to party competition,  see Ferguson,  1995a. 
46 23. Kenneally,  1981, pp.  156ff., has a short but ihuminating  discussion  ofthe  NRA equal 
pay movement.  He notes that  some twenty-five  percent  of the codes still clearly discriminated 
against women workers,  though  the episode  was widely acknowledged  to have given the equal 
pay movement  an enormous  lift. His discussion  is a warning of the pitfalls of any econometric 
e&r-t to neatly  divide politics  from economics  in this period  or to partial out the influence  of 
“government”  Gram  “unions.”  The only woman appointed  to the NRA’s  Labor Advisory  Board 
(who strongly  and rather  successful@ championed  the principle  of  equal pay) was on leave l%om 
. 
the  Women’s  Trade Union League. 
24. On the role of monetary  policy in briqing  about the  1920-2 1 recession,  see Hicks, 
1974, pp. 209.E The U.S. case is clear cut, particularly  in regard to why the policy of tight money 
continued  so long:  “Governor  Strong and Dr. Miller thought  wages were still too high.” 
@‘Atista,  1994, p. 61; summarizing material  from Fed minutes and policy  directives  @om early 
1921.) 
25. For the &king  rise in injunctions,  see the data in Wiie,  1932; after  1920 the trend 
could be mistaken  for a power  series; for the use of troops,  see the discussion  and sources  in 
Ferguson,  1995b.  Cf  also Goldstein,  1978, for statistics on meetings broken  up by the 
authorities.  As the Secretary  of the Treasury,  himself  a major Pittsburgh  mine owner,  hunously 
observed  at the time: “You can’t run a coal mine without  machine guns.” (What Mellon actuahy 
said was: “You could not run without  them.”  Cf. Koskoe  1978, p. 304.) 
26. The pursuit of minimum wage policies  embraced a good  deal more than passage  of the 
well known  minimum wage laws in this period.  See, e.g., Strackbein,  1939; rules on government 
47 procurement  were one such policy lever. 
27. The links between  economics  and politics  in this period are complex, but very 
powerfid. It is futile to attempt  to untangle  all of them  Wartime government  policy affected 
wages not only through  the policies of the National  Labor Relations  Board  -- itself  of course,  one 
of the earlier fruits of the high New Deal -- but through  war time controls  that often both 
deliberately  favored  unionization  under moderately  conservative  trade union leaders, but also 
frequently  sought to level up wages of the lowest paid workers  and prevent  wage cuts. In contrast 
to later times, many parts of organized  labor supported  this project  -  indeed prominent  labor 
leaders favored  continuing  wage controls  a&r  the war, along with wage policies that awarded the 
largestpercentagerisestothelowestpaid,m~thanthe~stsenior.  Thiserahasvhtuahy 
vanished from historical  memory, but see Montgomery,  1993. Employer  resistance  to these trends 
was quite fierce, and spilled over into major conflicts  over state as well as national  labor laws. The 
issue of equal pay also received  attention  during the war, particularly  Tom the National  War 
Labor Board.  See, e.g., Board, NIC,  1943. 
28. See e.g., Dunlop,  1957, Chapter  7; on Kale&i’s  “degree of monopoly”  and 
subsequent  controversies  about this notion,  see especially,  Sebastiar$l994,  particularly  chapter  2 
and Sawyer,  1985, pp. 28-42. Mehra’s discussion  (1976, p. 307) is also considerable  relevance 
here. 
29.  Another  potential  proxy for the change in aggregate  demand might be the negative  of 
the change in the unemployment  rate.  Not surprisingly,  a plot of this series against the first root 
also shows a good  tit, with a nearly identical correlation  coefficient  of .41.  The correlation  of real 
48 GNP movement  to this root  is somewhat  lower: 0.31.  We should note here that for expository 
purposes  in Figure IX we have taken the negative  of the calculated  first root  from the discriminant 
function;  for consistency  we also take the negative  of the calculated  canonical  scores.  So long as 
consistency  between coefficients  and scores is preserved,  this should have no e&t  on the 
i-lMl+. 
30. Estimating  which parts of the economy  were unionized  at what points  in this period 
can be tricky,  but the cases we discuss here are not controversial.  See the discussion  in Lewis 
(1963, pp. 258tK). Troy (1965) is also helpful. 
31.Loststrikesusuallydolittletoenhancethepoweroflabor.  Inthethirties,thereisno 
doubt that Labor’s success rate skyrocketed.  But statistics in fact exist for part of our period and 
con.Grm  that the percentage  of won strikes began rising -  at first very gently -- in the late 
twenties.  See Grit&r, 1939, and also the discussion in Edwards,  1981, p.139. There is no question 
that the Wagner Act, or@nally  passed in 1935 and influenced by the earlier Railway Labor Act 
(Ferguson,  1995% p. 17  1, a  104) eventuahy  made a major difference  in the outcomes  of labor 
disputes in this period.  But it should be noted  that only continued  political  pressures secured its 
effective implementation  and that member&p  in unions truly soared during the War. See 
Appendix 2 for the data on won and lost strikes. 
32. Leon&f’s  industrial categories  probably d.i.fZer  somewhat  from ours; this is particularly 
the case for utilities, where he included petroleum,  as well as coal. But given coal’s continuing 
enormous  importance,  it probably matters  little. An excellent summary of many trends in foreign 
trade, with details about how particular  industries tared in the US and worldwide  is Woytinsky 
49 and Woytinsky,  1955. See especially pp.  12OfK  An extremely interesting  summary of trends  in 
agriculture  is Ezekiel,  1932, which notes tbat many countries  protected  their agricultural 
populations  to preserve peasant proprietors  as bulwarks against communism. 
The figure is also of interest  for its suggestion  that textiles benefitted  from the outbreak  of 
war in 1939. 
33. Note  that all immigration  was not cut off during this period;  immigration  from North 
and Latin America continued. 
34. Goklin and Katz,  1995, document  rising high school enrollments  over time, increases 
in the numbers and proportions  of workers  who had completed  high school,  etc. 
35. On the differential  distribution  of educated workers  across industries in the inter-war 
period,  see, e.g., the discussion in Goklin and Katz,  1995; and particularly  their Tables A4 and  12. 
36.  In their Appendix, “Skill Ratios and Wage Distributions  1920s to  195Oq” Goklin and 
Margo  (1991) suggest cautiously  that some fluctuations  during part of our period  in a small 
portion  of the data within the railroad  series indicate changes in premia to skill that could be 
related to education.  Our cluster analysis examine s the whole structure  of railroad  wages. If 
variations  within the railroad  sector were substantial, this should be reflected  in diverging  series, 
Butin~varisttonswithinthe~oadsectorareamongthesmallestinthewagestructure~ 
the principal  source of variation  arises from diflbrences between the local and the through-freight 
lines. 
37. Note that education  should presumably have its main impact on wages through  its 
effects on productivity.  In this respect,  the dismal record  of econometric  attempts  to find relations 
50 between most industry level variables and wages during the post-war  period  of pattern  bargaiuing 
(e.g., Ecksteiu  and Wilson,  1962) serves as an eloquent  warning about overe~hasiziug 
productivity’s  effect on wage bargaius. 
38.  A referee suggested that we attempt  to measure the Theil statistic  strictly across our 
eight large chtsters.  This, however,  is difIicult to do with precision,  because the 26 employment 
categories  available to us do not xxxes&&  break cleanly iuto our eight large groups.  At any 
rate, our work on Theil statistics persuades us that more disaggregation  generally provides  more 
precise estimation  of the movement  of inequality overall,  which is the target  of this particular 
phase of the analysis. 
39. Because of the lop-sided  distribution  of capital gains that has historically  accompanied 
bii  rises in the stock market  (TNEC,  1940, p. 41-44), rising stock prices may of course  sharply 
increase inequality in the wealth structure  as they somewhat  equalize the wage structure. 
40. Haddy and Tolles,  1957, make the interesting  point that substantial numbers of 
employers  appear to have restructured  their work  schemes in order to tap into these untraditional 
reserves of labor. 
41. On the politics  of the  1946 Employment  Act, see especially Collins (1981) aud Burch, 
1973. 
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A Note  on Methods 
Our methods  are distinctive in  four respects.  These are, tir&  the use of time-series  data as 
a guide to aggregation  and classification;  secor~& the application  of numerical taxonomy  in the 
form of cluster analysis to determine  group  structure;  third  the application  of di  ’  *  t 
function  analysis to the resulting  groups,  including the extra&ion  of canonical  roots  that are, in 
consequence,  themselves  time series data; and fourth, the computation  of a between-group  Theil 
statistic  f?om industrial and data. 
1. Time Series Classilication 
The use of dated information  as a tool  for classification,  though  unknown  in economics,  is 
well-established  in disciplines such as geology,  paleontology  and archeology.  In evolutionary 
biology  and social psychology,  where living specimens may be observed,  simikuities in behavior 
through  time can form the basis of a classification  scheme. The same is true in epidemiology  and 
applied medicine, whose diagnostics  often rely on distinguishing  patterns,  through  time, in a 
course of symptoms. 
Classification  by time-series  has advantages  from a formal or numerical perspective.  Time- 
series can be converted  to percentage  rates of change, and therefbre  freed of all questions  of units 
and scale. Each year measured is exactly equivalent  to any other.  As the data set expands with 
the passage of time, new information  is acquired, but each new year is a declining proportion  of 
the total  information  available. Once a sufEcient set of years has accumulated,  classification  by 
time-series  tends to be relatively  stable. 
In our view, changes in annual average hourly wages are well-suited  to the industrial 
classification  problem  The notion  of industry-specific  labor rents is helpful here. If capital 
markets clear, but labor markets don’t, we should expect that rates of profit  equalize across 
industries but that skill-adjusted  rates of pay do not. There is, in fact, a persuasive  body of 
information  to this effect, sumfllan’lzed  in Katz and Summers (1989). 
Prior measures of industry-specific  labor rents have been essentially  static, based on the 
degree of monopoly  power at a particular  moment of time.  But as degrees of monopoly  change, 
then  industry-specific  labor rents will also change. And ifthat  is so, then the patterns  of change 
through  time can serve as markers of sim&ity  and difference among and between industries. 
To summa&e  this argument:  First, anything that alters the relative performance  of an 
industry -- whether technological  advance,  changing structure  of materials prices, or changing 
pattern  of competition  -willeventuallyshowupintheaveragewagethattheindustrycanpay. 
Second, when a pattern  of such changes is essentially identical in two  separate industrial 
subclassifications  over a long period  of time and a wide range of historical  experience,  it becomes 
increasingly unlikely that this is accidental.  Instead,  similar effects result from structural 
characteristics  that produce  like reactions  to common  causes.  And that being so, patterns  of 
similar effects can be used for industrial classif%xtion. 
52 2.  Cluster analysis. 
The application  of cluster analysis to our problem is straightiorward  (See Galbraith and 
Calmon,  1994 fix additional  details).  We begin with a rectanguku  Ihrt  matrix, H, of annual average 
hourly wages by industrial subcategory,  where categories  are chosen to be as disaggregated  as the 
available data permit.  In the present  analysis, we employ  81 separate  industrial classifications,  of 
which 3 1 are occupational  subcategories  in the railroad  industry  (including  four series that are 
composites  -- see Appendix 3), plus two composite  time series (average wages across 25 
manufacturing  industries and average wages on public road projects  across all regions)  that 
happen to be available in our data set.  We have virtua&  complete  data for  1920-1947. 
From H, we extract the tit-1  matrix G, of percentage  rates of change of average hourly 
wagesbyindustrialsubcategory,inthiscasefortheyears  1921-1947.  Missingdataatthisstage 
are tilled in by use of the annual average wage change across all categories.  In this way, all data 
can be employed  without  undue distortion  due to missing cases. G, of course,  is unit-free. 
Our cluster analysis evaluates  the similarity of the paths through  T-l  years of wage change 
in the n industrial  subcategories.-  It is based on the Euclidean  distance  metric d in t-l  dimensional 
hypempace,  the standard naeasureofdistancebetweentwopointsuandvwhereuisthedata 
point (%, q,  .  .  . a.&  and v is the point  &,b  ,... br); in this case the a’s and b’s represent  rates of 
change for each year. 
Cluster analysis may take many different  forms. We employ a hierarchical  agglomerative 
procedure  known  as Ward’s method,  which adds elements to groups at each step so as to 
minim&  the ratio of within-group  to between-group  variation  in d.  This method  is known  to 
produce  relatively  compact  clusters,  if clusters exist in the data. 
As we say in the text, the choice of level of aggregation  (number of groups)  is 
substantially  subjective.  We do employ a measure of information  loss from agglomeration  as an 
approximate  guide (not reported).  Our essential technique  in this paper, however,  is eyeball 
examination  of Figure I, using the vertical axis as a guide to the degree of separation  between 
groups.  Figure I has a number of possible stopping points; we choose  seven distinct  groups. 
One can quibble about this, but the fact is that one or two more or less makes very little dif5erence 
to the analysis, so long as one follows the group structure  of the tree d&ram+ 
3.  Discriminantanalysis 
In principle, cluster analysis reduces a tit-1  matrix G to the ht-I  matrix G’, which 
contains  annual rates of change of average wages for the k groups  identified.  G’ is an eflcient 
reduction  of G, since it contains  (nearly) the largest amount  of intergroup  variation  that can bc 
achieved, given a decision to reduce n to k.  The “average” rates of wage change so identified  are 
not precise,  since no weighting  by the size of the component  industrial  subcategories  is employed. 
But since the clusters themselves are chosen to minimize within-group  diftierences in annual rates 
of change, this source of error cannot  be very large.  Knowing the relative  size of the component 
subcategories  becomes important  only when one wishes to calculate  average wage levels or other 
types of information  for the composite  groups that the cluster analysis has constructed. 
The next step is to extract the principal elements of the intergroup  variation,  This is done 
through  the derivation  of the canonical  roots  of a disc  riminant function.  In matrix notation,  let B 
53 be the kxk matrix of between-group  sums of squares and cross-products  in annual rates of change 
of wages, and let W be the comqmding  lbrll  matrix of within-group  sums of squares and cross 
products.  Following  Rencher  (1992), we seek y=a’x,  which maxim&s  c  olry)lc(Yij  - 
yJ =a’Ba/a’Wa.  There will be k- 1 canonical  disc  riminant functions,  each of which is a linear 
combination  of annual impulses chosen to be uncorrelated  and orthogonal  to other  such 
combinations  and collectively  to exhaust the information  discrimiaating  between the behavior  of 
groups. Not  all of the k-l  roots  are economically  significant, however,  which is why we stop in 
this case at the first four which capture  98 percent  of the between-group  variation  [tr(W”  B)]. 
Ranking  canonical  roots  by their associated  eigenvalues,  we can arrive at the relative 
importance  of mutually uncorrelated  forces on the wage structure.  The uMandardized 
coefficients  of these canonical  roots  are themselves,  in this particular  case, time-series  variates.  It 
is appropriate  to treat them as impulses, or forces affecting rates of change.  To associate  them 
with actual historical  time-series,  we may either report them as though  they actual@ measured the 
rate of change of some underlying  force, or else convert  them to index numbers based on the year 
of origin of the data set (in which case they mimic the level of such an underlying  force).  Tbis 
choice depends on the nature  of the variables to which the canonical  roots  are being compared. 
For practical  purposes,  we find the microcomputer  program  Statistical  well-suited  to  the 
purposes  we describe above. 
In gene*  these procedures  may be applied to any disaggregated  time-series  data set 
capable of smooth aggregation,  including all data sets organized  by hierarchical  conventions.  In 
our experience,  they arc a potent  device for distilling and evaluating  historical  data organized  by 
industry,  and have applications  also in the interpretation  of national  income and product  accounts 
and in the analysis of governmen t budgets. 
4.  Computation  of Between-Croup  Theil Statistic 
The between-group  component  of Theil’s T statistic,  T’, is a well-known  lower-bound 
estimate  of inequality,  that will converge  to the population  T as the group stnzture  grows 
increasingly  disaggregated.  Our argument  is that the movements  of T’ will be highly correlated 
with unobservable  movements  of T, and that therefore  T’ computed  from our industrial data set is 
a useful indicator  of changes in wage inequality,  for a historical  period  for which household 
sample surveys do not exist on an annual basis. 
The formula for computing  T from grouped  data is: 
T = C@i  Pi /Cr)WPi,  cl)  +C(Pi  Pi/  PjT* 
(2) 
where pi is the proportion  of workers  employed  in the i-th group,  cr,  represents  the average 
income for the i-th group,  u represents  average overall income, and Ti  is the Thcil T as measured 
strictly within the i-th group.  The grouped  Theil statistic is the weighted  sum of that part of 
inequality that occurs between groups and a part that occurs within groups.  The formula for T’, 
the between-group-Theil  statistic,  is just the first (between-group)  element in the formula for 
computing  the Theil T from grouped  data: 
54 T’ = C(P,  Pi  /P)log(Pi  / Cr) 
(3) 
Since the within-group  element in variation  is omitted,  this is obviously  a lower-bound 
estimate of dhpersion. 
For present purposes,  as noted  in the text, we used the Historical  Statistics  of the United 
States for  1940 to measure relative  employment  in 26 industrial groups,  and compressed  our 83 
wage series into these 26 categories  by taking  simple averages  of wage rates from the Conference 
Board  and other  data sets.  In the case of fhrm wages, we estimated  a pseudo-hourly  wage rate 
f?om monthly  earnings data.  These procedures  are necessari& rough.  However,  it should be 
noted  that small effors  in estimating  individual group-wise  wage rates, due to lack of appropriate 
within-group  employment  weights,  are unlikely to have a signifhnt  effect on the large 
movements  of the resulting  Theil statistic. 
55 APpeMiix 2 
Description  of Data 
The principal  source of hourly wage data for manufacturing  industry in this study is Ada 
M. Beney,  National  Industrial  Con&rence  Board  Studies No. 229,  Wages, Hours and 
Employment in the United States, I91 4- I936, New York: National  Industrial  Conference  Board, 
Inc.,  1936. Most of these data series were continued  through  December,  1937 in a  Conference 
Board publication:  Wages, Hours, and Employment in the United States July, I936-December, 
1937, which was issued as a Supplement to Conference  Board  Service Letter,  June,  1938. Data 
for later years are drawn from issues of The Conference  Board’s Economic Almanac. 
Construction  wages are drawn from the  1942 and 1949 supplements  to the Suntey of 
Current Business (U.S. Department  of Commerce).  These series cover union and non-union 
worksites. 
Wages in the printing  trades are from “Union Wages and Hours: Printing Industry -- July 
I, 1967 and Trend 1907-67” Bulletin No.  1592, U.S. Department  of Labor, May  1968 and Part I 
of Historical Statistics of the United States. 
Gas and electric distriition  wages are in The Conference  Board, Economic Almanac for 
1948, p. 188. 
Wages on public road-building  projects  are I+om US Dep&ment  of Commerce,  The 
Statistical Abstract  of the United States, 1951, p. 202 and the Survey of Current Business, 1936 
Supplement, p. 42. 
Railroad wages are from Harry E. Jones, Railroad  Wages and Labor Relations,  1900- 
1952: A Historical Survey and Summary of Results, Bureau of Information  of the Eastern 
Railways,  1953. The data come origina&  from the Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
Hourly-equivalent  wages for thrm workers  are estimated  by the authors  from annual data 
on monthly ti  wage rates in U.S. Department  of Labor, Handbook of Labor Statistics  1950 
Edition. The method  is to convert  1920 f&n  wages to an approximate  hourly equivalent  by 
dividing by average hours in manufacturing,  and then to use the observed  rates of change in 
monthly wages to generate  the path of the corresponding  pseudo-hourly  series. Since &rm hours 
exceed manufacturing  hours by an unknown  amount,  this overstates  the average hourly farm wage 
and understates  the initial degree of inequality between  agricultural  and other wages when 
estimated  on an hourly basis.  But the patterns  of change in wages or inequality  should not be 
affected. 
Employment  data by industry for  1940 are drawn from the StatisticuZ  Abstract of the 
United States, 1947, Table No. 210, p. 191. 
Data on strikes and unionization  are t%om  the Census Bureau,  The Statistical  History of 
the United Statesfiom  Colonial Times to the Present, Stamford,  Fairheld  Publishers,  1965, and 
from William Goklner,  Strikes, Institute  of Industrial  Relations,  University  of California,  Berkeley, 
1951. 
Data on trade and commodity  prices are from RE.  Lapps, Price and Quuntity Trends in 
the Foreign Trade of the United States, Princeton, NBER,  1963, Tables A-3 and A-6 
Macroeconomic  data are from Robert J. Gordon,  ed.,  The American Business CycZe: 
56 Continuity  and Change, Chicago: University  of Chicago  Press,  1986. 
Exchange  rate data are from Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve  System, Banking 
and Monetary  Statistics,  1914-41, Washington,  DC.,  1943 and Banking  and Monetary  Statistics, 
1941-1970,  Washington,  D.C.,  1976. 
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List of Industry  Variables used and Variable Codes 
Heavy equipment 




Hosiery  aud knit goods 
25 Industry  Average 
Iron aud steel 
Leather  taming  and lXshing 
Agricultural  Implement 
Lumber and millwork 
Meat packing 
Automobile 
Paint and varnish 
Paper  aud  Pulp 
Boot  aud shoe 
Paper products 
Printing -  book  audjob 
chemical 
Printing -- news and xnag*s 
Rubber 
Cotton-North 
silk  (&Rayon) 
Wool 
Electrical  manuf&ming 
Farm wages 
Foundries  and Machine  Shops 
Mid-Atlantic 
Northeast 
East North  Central 
Foundries 
West North  Central 
West South Central 
Machiues and machine tools 








































Figure II Codes 
Ind25_MU,Ind25_MS 



































58 Pacific  Fa_Pac 
Public Roads  RoadsUS 
Mid-Atlantic  Ro_Midat 
Northeast  Roads-NE 
East North  Central  RosidENC 
West North  Central  RoadWNC 
West South Central  Road_WSC 
East South Central  RoadESC 
South Atlantic  Ro_So_At 
Mountain  Ro_Mount 
Pacific  Ro_Pacif 
coal  coal 
Gas Utilities  util_Gas 
Electric  Utilities  Util_Elec 
R&OlldS  RR(l  to 31) 
Common  Construction  Comm_Con 
Sk&d  construction  Skild_Co 


















Following  are the 31 subcategories  of wages by industrial  subsector  and occupation  for the 
railroad  indwtry  listed in order of their appearance  from left to right on Figure I. 
















Road Freight Brakemen  and Flagmen (Through  Freight) 
Road Freight Conductors  (Through  Freight) 
Road Freight Firemen and Helpers (Through  Freight) 
&dEtght  Engmeers and Motormen  (Through  Freight) 
Switch Tenders 
Yard Brakemen  and Yard Helpers 
Yard Conductors  and Yard Foremen 
Yard Engineem and Motormen 
Total  Road Freight Brakemen  and Flagmen 
Total Road Freight Conductors 
Total Road Freight Firemen and Helpers 
Total Road Freight Engineers  and Motormen 
Road Passenger Brakemen  and Flagmen 
Road Passenger Baggage Men 
Road Passenger  Conductors 
Road Passenger Firemen and Helpers 
Road Passenger Engineers  and Motormen 
Maintenance  of Way Croup 
Stationary  Engine and Boiler Room and Shop Laborers  Croup 











Clerical and Station Employees  Group 
Floating  Equipment  (Marine) Group 
Assistant  Road Passenger  Conductors  and Ticket  Collectors 
Outside and Inside Hostlers  and Helpers 
Road Freight Brakemen  and Flagmen (Local and Way) 
Road Freight Conductors  (Local and Way) 
Road Freight Firemen and Helpers (Local and Way) 
Train Dispatchers  Group 
Road Freight Engineers  and Motormen  (Local aud Way) 
Yard Firemen and Helpers 
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Determinants of Changing Inequality in the Wage Strncture,  1920-1947 
Dependent Variable: THEIL 
(T-Statistics  in parentheses) 
Alternative Specifications 
Independent 
Variables  #1  #2  #3  #4 
UNEMP  .918 
(11.1) 
DUNEMP  -- 
DNGNP  __ 
DRGNP 


































R2  .83  .94  .95  .95 
D-W  .38  1.71  .92  1.04 
Coefficients significant at .Ol level shown in bold; note that with serial correlation  in the residuals significance may be 
overstated. 
Variables  used: 
THEIL:  The dependent variable is the between-group  Theil statistic computed for 26 industrial groups using 1940 
employment weights, authors’ calculations. 
UNEh@: Unemployment  Rate, from Gordon (1986) 
DUNEMF? First difference  of UNEMP 
DNGNP: Change of nominal Gross National Product, from Gordon 
DRGNP:  Rate of change of real Gross National Product, also from Gordon. 
FOREXJAP: Index of US/Japan exchange rates; no change assumed for the period afler trade relations end in 1942-45. 
STRKERS:  Number of workers involved in strikes, in thousands. 
Coefficients reported are Durbin Betas. 
NOTE:  In an test of altemanve  specifications, we ran forward stepwise regression on a larger set of  regressors 
including the three demand variables and the sterling exchange rate as well the yen exchange rate and STRIKERS. 
Regressors included in the results were UNEMF’, DNGNP, STRIKERS and FOREXJAP,  in that order.  In a backward 
stepwise regression only UNEMP and DNGNF’ survived exclusion. 
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Within  or Between  Industries? 
This  chart shows that the two GoMin/Margo railroad wage ratios  for 
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axrelated with the overall movement of railroad wages rebtive to 
manufkturin~  This cdirms  the FeqpodGalbraith  qument  that 
the same  ecmomic  forces  oprated within industries  as  between  them. 
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Inequality  and  Unemployment 
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